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Abstract 
Experimental literature has accumulated evidence on the association of 
personal characteristics to a higher or lower level of prosocial behavior. There 
is also evidence that donations are affected by the mere provision of 
information about the recipients, whatever its nature or content. In this paper, 
we present a unified experimental framework to analyze the impact of social 
class, political orientation and gender on the level of giving; our experimental 
design allows us to reveal the effect of providing information by itself, with 
respect to the baseline treatment of no information, and separately from the 
effect of the informational content. These results could be relevant to any 
design intended to measure the impact on altruism of different manipulations 
of the Dictator Game.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
One distinctive feature of humans is their ability to help -being prosocial- unrelated individuals 
(strangers) even in one-shot sporadic interactions. Understanding why people donate to strangers is 
an essential element of the human pro-social puzzle. The 25 years of laboratory research in 
altruism using the Dictator Game (DG hereafter) has provided a number of insightful answers (see 
Engel, 2011, and the references therein):  sense of inequity aversion, identity, warm glow, guilt 
aversion (due to the recipient’s expectations), social pressure or social distance, are all forces 
behind social behaviour. These motivations are complementary and depending on the experimental 
framing, one or several may become more relevant. 
Previous research has also shown that there are certain factors that modulate altruism - compared to 
the baseline of an anonymous DG. On the one hand, there are factors related to the donor’s 
personal characteristics that have been found to be correlated with giving. Among them, social 
class (Hoffman, 2011; Piff et al., 2010; Bechler, Green and Myerson, 2015), political ideology 
(Zettler and Hilbig, 2010), religion (Brañas-Garza, Espin and Neumann, 2014; Forbes and 
Zampelli, 2013; Eckel and Grossman, 2004; Anderson and Mellor, 2009) and gender1 (Andreoni 
and Vesterlund, 2001; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; and Eckel and Grossman, 1998). On the other 
hand, experimental results indicate that not only the donor’s attributes but also the available 
information on the recipient’s characteristics modulate altruism. For instance, individuals are more 
likely to increase their donations when the recipients are poor (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Holm and 
Engseld, 2005; and Brañas-Garza, 2006) or when the social distance to the recipient is short 
(Leider et al., 2009; Brañas-Garza et al., 2010; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; and Rege and Telle, 2004). 
Subjects are also sensitive to the sex of the recipient and women receive higher donations than men 
(Dufwenberg and Muren, 2000; and Engel, 2011). Moreover, there is an effect of the recipient 
knowing the sex identity of the donor (Eckel and Grossman, 2002). Thus, previous research has 
established that the personal characteristics both of dictator and recipient matter for giving. Some 
of these personal attributes define a social category, and membership triggers a different behavior 
towards in-group members and outsiders (see Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini, 2007; and Chen 
and Li, 2009). Lastly, it has also been shown that subjects are quite sensitive to the conditions of 
                                                
1 Aguiar et al. (2010) shows that women are also expected to be more generous. Brañas-Garza et al. (2018) replicates 
the result in the field among MTurkers. 	
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anonymity of dictator and recipient (Hoffman et al., 1994; Charness and Gneezy, 2008; Frohlich, 
Oppenheimer and Moore, 2001). A possible explanation is that anonymity has a cost in terms of 
credibility (see Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Moore, 2001) so that providing more information about 
the recipient may make donations more credible and promote giving.  
Here we present the results of an experimental design that allows us to reveal the effect of 
providing information by itself, with respect to the baseline treatment of no information, and 
separately from the effect of informational content concerning wealth, sex and ideology. In a 
within-subjects Dictator Game experiment, we elicit the personal attributes of the participants that 
define their social category (natural groups) and we compare the outcome under different 
information sets available to the donor and recipient.  
We build a unified experimental framework to test the effect of these factors, by changing the 
information provided in each treatment to donor and recipient. Social preferences may follow a 
differential pattern depending on the combination of characteristics of the donor and the recipient 
and we measure the relative effects. For this purpose, in our within-subjects design participants 
take decisions under several informational conditions and those decisions appear sequentially in a 
random order; this allows us to study how subjects react to different information sets on attributes 
and a comparison of their relative strength.  
Another important feature of this research –compared to previous laboratory experiments- is the 
use of natural groups. Previous work on in-group and out-group differences in behavior has 
introduced the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971), inducing the membership that 
generates the weakest cohesion required to produce discrimination. Instead, in our experiment the 
groups correspond to the actual characteristics of donors and recipients, which were collected 
before the experiment took place, and relate to wealth (Poor and Rich), gender (Men and Women), 
and political orientation (Right-wing and Left-wing). All these personal characteristics were self-
reported in an online questionnaire during the recruitment process.  
At the beginning of the experiment donors were reminded their actual social categories (wealth, 
gender and political orientation). Then they faced several DG in which they had different pieces of 
information about the recipient or about the donor’s information available to the recipient. In the 
baseline case, no additional information was provided. In Treatment 1 (T1) the dictator was 
informed about a social category of the recipient. According to the theoretical literature on identity 
	 4	
and in-group and out-group effects, for some social categories we expect that donations to in-group 
members be higher than donations to out-groups (for example, political orientation); this could be 
the result of favoring their in-group at the expense of the out-group. However, for other social 
categories we expect inequity aversion to increase donations when the recipient is poor, in line with 
previous results in the literature. 
We also expect that the introduction of saliency in group membership affect donations. Following 
Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007), a group is salient if the members of the group not only 
know their membership but also believe that others know it. In Treatment 2 (T2), subjects were 
told that the recipient would know their membership to a particular social category. Note that in 
this treatment, what is at stake is the concern about the image of the group to which the subject 
belongs but not the welfare of in-group or out-group since the donor ignores the social category of 
the recipient.  
In Treatment 3 (T3), we made saliency even stronger by giving all the information about 
membership in a social category to the donor and the recipient. In this treatment, two aspects of 
identity are involved: in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination as well as the status of the 
group. 
An important finding is that providing information, regardless of its nature or content, has a 
positive effect on donations. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the 
experimental design, its implementation, and a description of the treatments and procedures. In 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 we present the results related to information on gender, wealth and political 
orientation. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
a) Main features of the design 
The experiment consists of 16 dictator games that differ in the information sets provided to 
dictators and recipients. There is a baseline treatment where no information is provided; in the 
other three treatments, participants have an additional piece of information. Each subject faces the 
treatments in a different random order (within-subject design). Thus, we have information about 16 
randomly sorted decisions taken in the same controlled location, with instructions presented in a 
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similar fashion. This allows us to have a unified framework to explore the effect of information on 
donations. The information refers specifically to wealth, sex and political orientation. Three 
important features of the design should be considered: 
• Donors took the 16 decisions in a random order to control for order effects. 
• Additionally, to avoid the potential wealth effects throughout the experiment, dictators 
knew that only a randomly chosen decision would be paid.  
• Natural groups. No artificial labels or groups were used, but the actual attributes of dictators 
and recipients defined membership to a social category.   
 
b) Implementation 
The experiment was conducted at Universidad de la República (Uruguay). It was announced via 
posters and verbal information in regular class time. Most of the subjects were undergraduate 
students of Political Science, Sociology, Social Studies and Economics.  
In order to elicit the natural groups, we asked the students interested in participating to fill a 
questionnaire in which they answered questions about the (perceived) socio-economic position of 
their family (which we call wealth), their personal political orientation and gender. The first two 
variables were collected in a 10-step scale where 1 was extremely Poor / extreme-Left and 10, 
extremely Rich / extreme-Right. Anonymity was always respected. The participants were identified 
by an e-mail address given by them and we did not ask their names.  
We recruited 192 participants. The histograms in Figure 1 show the distribution of wealth and 
ideology of the 192 registered subjects (115 women and 77 men). The median and mode of wealth 
are 5; for ideology, these statistics are 4 and 5, respectively. 
Using self-reported information we classified the subjects as follows: those below the median of 
the wealth distribution were labeled as Poor and those above the median were labeled as Rich. The 
subjects who had reported a position-value identical to the median value where randomly assigned 
to the Poor or Rich group. Analogously, we labeled the subjects as Left-wing or Right-wing. We 
additionally registered the subject’s self-reported sex: Female, Male.  
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Figure 1: Histograms of wealth and ideology 
 
The dictators’ sample is composed of 88 subjects (51% are Rich, 36% are Right-wing and 32% are 
Men). The under-representation of Right-wing subjects is due to their higher absenteeism rate but 
the under-representation of men responds to the sex composition of the registered students. 
The subjects were given verbal and printed instructions. The first information they received was 
their social category of wealth, political orientation and sex.2  We also explained to them the 
method we used for classification. Those disappointed with their label were allowed to mention it 
but not to change their status. In fact, 33% did not feel themselves identified with the resulting 
category of Rich, 9% with Poor, 44% with Right-wing and 4% with Left-wing.  
The general dictator game consisted of inviting to allocate 10 bills of 20 Uruguayan pesos each 
(around 10 American dollars) between the participant and a randomly chosen student who was not 
in the same room and will never be a dictator. The task was explained in one sheet of a printed 
booklet. Following List (2007) instructions, the possible payoffs were presented on a line on the 
sheet and the subjects had to mark their decision with a circle. The amount of money ranged from 0 
pesos (left-end) to 200 pesos (right-end) restricting donations to multiples of 20, that is 0, 20, 40, 
…, 200. 
                                                2	Notice that each booklet had to be personalized. We identified each booklet writing the subject’s e-mail on the first 
page of the booklet. After receiving the booklet, the student threw away that page in order not to be identified. A copy 
of the original booklet is available on request. The appendix contains the translation of the instructions for three of the 
16 decisions.	
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The average dictator’s earnings were 142.5 pesos (7.13 bills) and the average recipient earnings 
were 57.5 pesos (2.87 bills).  
 
c) Treatments 
The experiment includes a baseline and three information treatments. In the baseline, the dictator 
only knows his or her own social categories. Under treatment 1 (T1), the subjects know from the 
recipient group only one of the social categories (“I know about the recipient”). Thus, T1 
comprises six tasks: donation to a Woman, a Man, a Rich, a Poor, a Left-wing and a Right-wing, 
regardless the donors’ characteristics.  
Donations under T1 allow us to test hypotheses about the effect of information and the effect of 
informational content. First, note that if information about the recipient has a positive effect on 
donations, donations in T1 should be greater than in the baseline whatever the content of the 
information (Appendix 1 contains an example to make this point more clear). For instance, if the 
average of donations in T1 when the information is “the recipient is a man” and donations when the 
information is “the recipient is a woman” is greater than the average of donations in the baseline, 
we can conclude that information about gender per se has a positive effect. In the baseline, donors 
already know that the recipient is either a man or a woman, so that the decision under incomplete 
information should be in between the average donation when recipient is a man and when it is a 
woman. Thus, the difference between donations in T1 and the baseline is an appropriate indicator 
to assess the hypothesis that the mere provision of information has an effect. 
Second, the group membership effect is related to the information content and it should trigger 
favoritism for in-group over out-group. Thus, under this hypothesis, denoting T1j_in and T1j_out the 
donations under T1 of members of social category j (j = sex, wealth or political orientation) to the 
members of the in-group and out-group, respectively, we expect (T1j_in - T1j_out) to be positive at 
least for some social categories.   
In T2, we introduce saliency announcing to the donors that their type will be known by the 
recipient (“the recipient knows about me”). Thus, T2 comprises three tasks according to the donor 
actual features: Woman or Man, Rich or Poor and Left-wing or Right-wing. In this treatment, the 
subject cannot distinguish between in-group or out-group recipients. But the image of the group is 
at stake; moreover, following the prescriptions associated with a group strengthens identity and 
	 8	
therefore increases utility (see Akerloff and Kranton, 2000; and Aguiar et al. 2010). The 
prescription of being generous may be stronger for some groups, so this phenomenon would 
reinforce the effect of social image. We expect higher donations in T2 than in the baseline because 
of social image and the pursuit of the social category prescriptions. 
In T3, we increase saliency through shared information about the group membership of the donor 
and recipient. Specifically: a) the dictator and recipient have information about each other’s group 
membership, and b) they know that both know this information. The treatment comprises six tasks 
as in T1 (“I know about the recipient, I know that the recipient knows about me, I know that the 
recipient knows that I know”). We expect higher donations in T3 than in the baseline and also 
higher than in T1 due to stronger saliency through public information. Thus, we expect the 
difference (T3j_in –T1j_in) to be positive. 
d) The booklet 
All the tasks were presented in a booklet (one task per page). The sheet of each task had a similar 
appearance. In the T1 sheets, the labels of the six groups (Man, Woman, Rich, Poor, Right-wing, 
Left-wing) were printed in a column under the title “Information about your partner”. One of them 
was circled, indicating that the recipient was a subject with that specific attribute.  
In the T2 sheet, the labels of the six groups were printed in a column under the title “Information 
about you”. One of them was circled. The circle indicated the donor’s characteristic that the 
recipient will know. No second column was provided.  
T3 was presented in a sheet with two columns: on the left column the title was “Information about 
you” and on the right column, “Information about your partner” (see the Appendix 1). The circled 
characteristics indicated the attributes of the donor and recipient. All this information would be 
known by donor and recipient.  
For the baseline treatment there was no circled characteristic.  
 
e) Notation 
We will denote sex as “s”, wealth as “w” and political orientation as “p”. The donations in tasks of 
treatment 2 will be denoted T2s, T2w and T2p. For in-group donations (e.g. males to males) we will 
use “s_in”, “w_in” and “p_in”. For donations to out-group subjects (e.g. from rich to poor) we will 
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use “s_out”, “w_out” and “p_out”. For example, in T1s_in the donor knows that the recipient is of 
the same sex as herself, and in T1w_out the donor knows that the recipient belongs to the opposite 
social category of wealth.  
 
f) Empirical strategy 
In order to analyze decisions under different information sets, we build a database of 16 
observations per subject (1408 observations) and we estimate a model where the dependent 
variable is the level of the donation.  
As we observe levels of donations from 0 to10 bills, we treat the dependent variable as stemming 
from a latent variable that is observed in [0,10] and censored otherwise. We state that the latent 
variable depends on characteristics of the donor and the treatment.  
There are three sets of explanatory variables, each one dealing with information about a 
characteristic (s, w, p). The set of variables concerning information about income includes: a) a 
dummy variable that distinguishes Poor from Rich; b) a set of five dummy variables that identify 
the treatments related to income T1i_in, T1i_out, T2i, T3i_in, T3i_out; and c) the interactions between the 
income dummy variable and each of the treatments. The sets that capture the effect of information 
about sex and political orientation comprise analogous variables. In addition, we have two dummy 
variables that indicate if the dictator is unhappy with the labels of income or political orientation.  
We estimate a Tobit model. Since we use the same subjects for the different treatments, in all the 
estimations we adjust for within-cluster correlation to obtain a robust variance, as proposed by 
Froot (1989) and implemented by Rogers (1993) in STATA software.  
For the assessment of group membership we compare the difference of the marginal effects of 
T1j_in and T1j_out, calculated from the Tobit model, interpreted as a measure of the increase of 
donations to in-group over out-group. Finally, the effect of saliency is revealed through the average 
marginal effects of T2 and T3. The marginal effect of T2j measures the increase of donations (in 
relation to the baseline) due to information on the donor’s social category. The marginal effect 
(T3s_in-T1s_in) indicates the increase of donations due to revealing donor and recipient social 
category, in relation to just informing the donor of the social category of the recipient, when donor 
and recipient have the same membership. We also analyze (T3s_out-T1s_out), that is, the reaction 
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when donor and recipient belong to different groups. Finally, we also use the marginal effect to 
calculate (T3s_in-T3s_out) - (T1s_in-T1s_out), that is, the change in the difference between the in-group 
over the out-group when we pass from only informing the donor of the recipient’s social category 
to making public the social category of both donor and recipient. 
The assessment of the effect of information provision will be based on the average marginal effect 
of T1 for all groups (calculated from predictions of the Tobit model on the latent dependent 
variable), that is, the estimated increase of donations due to revealed information about the 
recipient. To illustrate how we measure the effect of information as distinct from the effect of the 
informational content consider the following example. 
Example. Each subject has to make a decision on how to share an endowment of size 10 with 
another individual randomly chosen from a population, where half the individuals are type A and 
the other half are type B. He has other-regarding preferences so that he cares about others’ 
wellbeing, but the subject is not indifferent between types A and B and values type A utility with 
higher weight:  
U(10-x) + αi U(x), 
where i is the type of the recipient,  αA > αB and for the sake of simplicity we are assuming 
everyone has the same utility function U, with U’>o and U’’<0. The difference between αA and αB 
may reflect behavior differences towards in-group and out-group agents; or the social distance 
between the dictator and the recipient; or even inequity aversion with a larger weight if the 
recipient is perceived as a person with less resources than the dictator. 
With no information, being aware that there is ½ probability that the recipient is type A and ½ the 
recipient is B, his decision is to give an amount x to maximize expected utility: 
½[U(10-x) + αA U(x)]+½[ U(10-x) + αB U(x)]. 
From the first order condition we obtain: 
U’(10-x)/U’(x)   =  ½αA +½αB. 
where x denotes the amount given to a recipient of unknown type.  
While in the case the type of the recipient i is known: 
U’(10-xi)/U’(xi)   =  αi 
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where xi denotes the amount given to type i.  
From these equations, since αA > αB , and U’(10-x)/U’(x) is increasing in the amount donated x, if 
the subject is certain that the recipient is type A, he would give more than x,  xA>x,  and if he knows 
the recipient is type B he would give less than x,  xB<x. If this were the case, information per se 
would not increase nor decrease donations: giving would only increase or decrease with respect to 
the baseline depending on the informational content.  
On the contrary, if we observe that xA>xB>x, we can attribute this to the effect of information 
disclosure, since from the previous argument x should be between xA and xB. 
 
3 RESULTS 
Figure 3 shows the mean donation for the 16 different information conditions, and in Table 1 we 
show average donations (in bills) and the percentage of selfish decisions (giving 0). 
 
Figure 3: Average donations  
 
 
The average donation increases from 2.3 bills in the baseline to around 3 bills under T1, 
corresponding the highest (lowest) rise to the case in which the subject makes a donation to a 
recipient of the same (opposite) political orientation. Average donation also increases to around 3 
bills when the recipient knows the membership of the donor (T2). Finally, results under T3 are 
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similar to those under T1. Note that the percentage of selfish decisions (giving 0) in the baseline is 
higher than when the donors know the group-membership of the recipient. 
 
Table 1: Average donation and the percentage of selfish decisions in each treatment. 
 
 Information about sex Information about wealth Information about politics 
 Donation % selfish Donation % selfish Donation % selfish 
T1 3.1 21.7 3.3 28.4 2.9 29.6 
T2 3.0 28.4 3.1 26.4 3.2 20.7 
T3 3.3 21.6 3.2 28.7 2.9 26.9 
Note: In the baseline the average donation is 2.3 bills and the percentage of selfish decisions is 44.3. 
 
To estimate the treatment effects we run a Tobit regression; the estimated parameters are reported 
in Appendix 2. The estimations indicate that the donor’s characteristics are irrelevant to explain 
donations in the baseline. Neither the discomfort with the socio-economic and ideological position 
labels are significant at the usual statistical levels. In the following subsections we present the 
marginal effects of each treatment. 
 
3.1 THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ABOUT SEX 
Table 2 reports the marginal effects of information about sex. 
The effect of information disclosure. We show the estimated marginal effects of T1s_in and T1s_out, 
that is, the increase in donations (relative to the baseline) due to information on the recipient’s sex 
(see block A in Table 2). The effects are positive and significant for Men and for Women, 
regardless the sex of the recipients. In sum, these results indicate that both women and men 
increase their donations when they know the sex of the recipient, whatever the sex of the recipient.   
As the donors have their sixteen tasks in one booklet so they can revise their decisions, and they are 
aware that the recipient can only be a male or a female, why would the donors give less in the 
baseline than both in T1s_in and T1s_out? Giving information on the recipient seems to increase 
donations independently of the type of information. The usual argument is that information makes 
more credible the fact that donations will actually be implemented, encouraging the likelihood of 
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giving and the level of donations (Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Moore, 2001). However, given our 
within-subjects design, credibility is likely to be constant throughout the experiment. Thus, 
information provision seems to have an effect separately from that of credibility.  
In subsequent sections, we will also check this effect for wealth and political orientation.    
This result indicates that the positive effect of information on giving should be separated from the 
effect of the content of the information given. That is, whenever some information is provided in 
an experiment, one should be aware of the fact that its effect on altruism may not be attributable to 
the content but to the mere provision of information. 
Group membership. As reported in Table 2 (block A), both groups are more generous to Women 
than to Men (a similar result was also found by Engel (2011) in a meta-study of the dictator game). 
The in-group effect appears to be more important for Women (the estimated effect of T1s_in is 1.8) 
than for Men (0.7). Men give more than Women to the out-group: T1s_out.  
 
Table 2: Tobit regression. Estimated marginal effects of information about sex 
 
Men Women 
A. Information by itself 
    Marginal effects a/ 
 
 
 
 
T1s-in 0.7 ** 1.8 *** 
T1s-out 1.7 *** 1.0 *** 
B. Group Membership  
 
 
T1s-in-T1s-out  b/ -1.0 *** 0.8 *** 
C. Saliency 
 
 
  T2s  a/ 0.8 ** 1.3 *** 
T3s-in-T1s-in b/ 0.1  0.0  
T3s-out-T1s-out b/ -0.3  -0.2  
(T3s-in-T3s-out) - (T1s-in-T1s-out) b/ 0.4	**	 0.2 
	* p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Notes:  
a/ the marginal effect is the estimated increase of the donation due to the treatment (related to the baseline)  
b/ Difference of marginal effects 
 
These different results for Women and Men concerning group membership are highlighted when we 
calculate the difference between T1s_in and T1s_out (block B in Table 2). In brief, Women favor their 
own group over the opposite but Men do not follow this pattern: they show more solidarity towards 
Women than towards Men. Hence, we find a positive group-membership effect for Women and 
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negative for Men. These results are similar to those obtained in previous research on gender 
differences (Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006; Holm and Engseld, 2005). 
Saliency. In T2 we manipulate the information to bring into play the image of the group: donors 
are informed that the recipient will know the sex of the person who is making the donation.  We 
find a positive effect of this information on giving, higher for Women than for Men (T2s in block 
C). This result would imply that social image is stronger for Women. Moreover, Women may be 
aware of the fact that they are more generous than Men (see Eckel and Grossman, 2001) and that 
they are expected to be more generous (Aguiar et al., 2010, Branas-Garza et al. 2018), and 
pursuing that social norm they react more to information disclosure than Men (Pereda et al, 2017).  
In sum, our results would indicate that gender identity feelings are stronger for Women than for 
Men, which is consistent with the previous result of the membership effect. 
In T3 we manipulate information in order to modulate saliency, by making public the group 
membership of donors and recipients. They know the sex of each other and they know that both 
have that information. We expect that common knowledge strengthen the effect of group 
membership. However, we do not find significant changes when we calculate the effect of T3 over 
T1 neither when giving to the in-group nor to the out-group.  Nevertheless, the difference (T3_in-
T3_out) - (T1_in-T1_out) is significant for Men (block C). Thus, though common knowledge does not 
seem to have a strong additional effect relative to T1, saliency increases the relative donation 
Men/Woman. Men still favor the out-group over the in-group, but the gap narrows. 
 
3.2 THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ABOUT WEALTH 
The sensitivity of donations to income, wealth or social status of the recipient has been explained 
by fairness concerns. Rich subjects would perceive as fair to decrease their advantage and therefore 
they would give more to a Poor recipient. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) formalize fairness as a self-
centered inequity aversion. Subjects suffer a loss of utility when they have an advantageous 
position and would sacrifice part of their resources to reduce the monetary gap, motivated by 
feelings of guilt (see Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Branas-Garza, Rodriguez-Lara and 
Sanchez, 2017). When in a disadvantageous position, subjects suffer an even larger utility loss 
based on feelings of envy (see Cabrales and Ponti, 2015). In the light of these considerations, we 
will interpret the effect of the treatment consisting on providing information about wealth. 
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The effect of information disclosure. In block A of Table 3 we show the effect of T1. For Rich 
subjects we have results consistent with the hypothesis that there is a positive effect on donations 
just for giving information about the recipient, whatever the group. Indeed, the marginal effects are 
4.4 and null when the recipient is Poor and Rich, respectively. Note that when the Rich subjects are 
told that the recipient is Rich, inequality concerns à la Fehr and Schmidt (1999) would imply lower 
donations than in the baseline (where recipients may be Poor or Rich), but just providing 
information increases donations which would compensate for the potential decrease.  
The result is not the same for the Poor subjects. They decrease their donation when the recipient is 
Rich (the effect of T1w_out is -1.6) and increase it when the recipient is Poor (3.1). Note that because 
of the construction of the groups (that was explained to the participants) in the baseline about half 
of the recipients are Poor and the other half are Rich. Thus, the average giving to the in-group and 
the out-group should coincide with the baseline and in the sum of T1w_in and T1w_out the effect 
should cancel out. But T1w_in is larger than the absolute value of T1w_out. This is due to the fact that 
providing information has a positive effect by itself. 
Group membership. The estimated effects reported in block B of Table 3 indicate that information 
about recipient’s wealth is not neutral and reflects inequality concerns.  
Indeed the Rich increase their donation when the recipient is Poor, and T1w_in - T1w_out is negative (-
5.0) as expected by the fairness concerns. It is also possible that this increase in donations stems 
from a social identity that prescribes that “the Rich should help the Poor”. That is, the behavior 
could also be the outcome of a social norm. Whatever the explanation, the negative value of (T1w_in 
- T1w_out) indicates that we do not find an in-group / out-group effect. However, as we find a 
positive effect of T2 (see below) we interpret that the inequality aversion or social identity effects 
are big enough to offset a potential positive impact of group-membership. 
For the Poor subjects, T1w_in - T1w_out is positive (4.7) as a result of fairness concerns, that in this 
case cannot be distinguished from a positive in-group effect and a negative out-group effect.  
Saliency. Information about the dictator’s wealth group has a positive effect no matter the group 
(T2w in block C). When the dictator is Poor, inequality concerns would imply a lower donation 
than in the baseline (after all, being poor is a good excuse for not giving). However, we observe 
just the opposite, donations increase.  
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We might argue that the reaction of Rich subjects is triggered by guilt aversion (recipients would 
expect to receive a high donation if the donor is Rich; see Charness and Dufwenberg, 2007), but 
this argument would not explain why Poor subjects give more. In sum, the positive effect of T2 on 
giving suggests that Rich and Poor behave as if they actually were concerned with their group-
image. 
 
Table 3: Tobit regression. Estimated marginal effects of information about wealth 
 
Rich Poor 
A. Information by itself 
    Marginal effects a/     
T1w-in -0.6  3.1 *** 
T1w-out 4.4 *** -1.6 *** 
B. Group Membership  
 
 
T1w-in-T1w-out b/ -5.0 *** 4.7 *** 
C. Saliency 
 
 
  T2 w a/ 1.5 *** 1.0 *** 
T3w-in-T1w-in b/ 0.6 * -0.5 * 
T3w-out-T1w-out b/ -0.6  0.3  
(T3w-in-T3w-out) - (T1w-in-T1w-out) b/ 1.2 ** -0.8 *** 
* p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Notes:  
a/ the marginal effect is the estimated increase of the donation due to the treatment (with respect to the 
baseline)  
b/ Difference of marginal effects 
 
Finally, there is an effect of making public all information over only informing the recipient’s 
group ((T3_in-T3_out) - (T1_in-T1_out) in block C of Table 3. In the case of the Rich subjects, the 
difference is positive (1.2). This is due to the increase in giving to the in-group (T3_in- T1_in). Thus, 
though the in-group effect is not strong enough to increase the donation (T1w_in), the Rich subjects 
are concerned with how their peers perceive them.  
 On the contrary, for the Poor the group membership effect ((T3_in-T3_out) - (T1_in-T1_out) is negative. 
This is due to a decline of the donations to the Poor (T3_in- T1_in).  It seems as if Poor donors find 
some relief when it is public that both are Poor and feel less compelled to give.  
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3.3 THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICAL ORIENTATION 
We present the main results related to the treatments with information about political orientation in 
Table 4. Though this table is analogous to the tables presented below, there are two additional 
columns in which we report the outcome of an alternative estimation that accounts for the fact that 
some subjects felt unhappy with their label (the median of the political orientation was 4 in a scale 
from 1 to 10, so that subjects who marked 5 were labelled as Right-wing).  In this estimation the 
Strong Right-wing partisans group is made up by subjects who marked 5 to 9 (no one marked 10) 
and were not displeased by being branded Right-wing (50% marked 5). On the other extreme, we 
label the subjects who reported levels 1, 2 or 3 Strong Left-wing partisans if they were not 
displeased by being branded Left-wing.  
Thus, in the last two columns we dropped the subjects who were displeased by being branded 
Right-wing (who had all marked 5) and the Left-wing who marked 4 or 5. Note that according to 
the marks, we capture a higher frequency of extreme positions in the strong Left than in the strong 
Right group. 
The effect of information disclosure. We find once again evidence of the effect of information by 
itself (block A in Table 4). 
For Right-wing subjects, the effect of information on giving is positive when the recipient is an in-
group and null when the recipient is an out-group. The outcome is the same when we consider only 
the Strong Right-wing partisans, though they seem to be more sensitive to their in-group members. 
The picture is similar for Left-wing subjects.  
Donors behave as if in the baseline there was not a 50-50 probability that the recipient is Right or 
Left (though they knew these probabilities since the beginning of the experiment).  
Group membership. We find a group membership effect for Strong Right-wing partisans and the 
two samples of Left-wing subjects. The range of increase in the donation is between 2 and 3 (block 
B in Table 4). Note that in general the group effect comes from a larger generosity to the in-group 
but not at the expense of the out-group (T1p_out is null), although in the case of Strong Left-wing 
T1p_out is negative and weakly significant. 
Saliency. When subjects know their political orientation will be disclosed to the recipient, they all 
increase the donation (block C in Table 4). However, we do not find an effect of T3 over T1.  
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Table 4: Tobit regression. Estimated marginal effects of information about political orientation 
 
 
Right-
wing 
Left-
wing 
Strong 
Right- 
wing 
Strong 
Left- 
wing 
A. Information by itself 
    
    
Marginal effects a/ 
    
    
T1p-in 1.3*** 2.1*** 1.9 *** 2.0 *** 
T1p-out 0.7  -0.4  -0.4  -0.7 * 
B. Group Membership   
 
     
T1p-in-T1p-out b/ 0.7  2.5*** 
 
2.3 ** 2.7 *** 
C. Saliency 
 
 
  
    
T2 p  a/ 1.3 *** 1.5 *** 1.7 *** 1.4 *** 
T3p-in-T1p-in b/ -0.6  0.1  -1.2  0.3  
T3p-out-T1p-out  0.0  0.5  0.9  0.5  
(T3p-in-T3p-out) - (T1p-in-T1p-out) b/ -0.6  -0.4  -2.0  -0.2  
* p<0.1;** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Notes:  
a/ the marginal effect is the estimated increase of the donation due to the treatment (related to the baseline)  
b/ Difference of marginal effects 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We conduct an experiment to study the effect of information disclosure about the social categories 
of donor and recipient in a dictator game. The design allows us to separate the effect of information 
provision and that of the informational content. 
We find that providing information about any of the recipient’s characteristic increases giving, 
regardless of the information disclosed. One implication of our results is that the effect of 
information per se, independent of its content, is not negligible and it could be mistaken with the 
effect of the informational content. This result should be taken into account in experiments 
measuring differences in altruism under different conditions, which could be attributed mistakenly 
to the particular condition introduced but may be due just to the effect of providing information.  
It is worth noting that we identify an effect of information disclosure that is distinct from its impact 
on credibility (Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Moore, 2001). The reason is that ours is a within 
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subjects design where the order of decisions is randomized and therefore it cannot be argued that 
credibility changes from decision to decision. 
When informing the donor of a recipient’s characteristic, the increase of donation to in-group over 
out-group ranged from -5.0 (Rich) to 2.7 (Strong Left-wing). In fact, political orientation is the 
social category that best suits the expected behavior from an in-group / out-group perspective. Both 
Right-wing and Left-wing subjects favor their in-group over the out-group, though the results are 
less robust for the Right-wing than for Left-wing individuals. This effect is due to generosity with 
in-group but not at the expense of the out-group, except in the case of Strong Left-wing partisans 
who favor Left-wing and discriminate against Right-wing subjects.  
Two other social categories react with an in-group / out-group perspective: Women and Poor. 
Women increase donations to both Women and Men, but the rise is higher for the former than for 
the latter. Poor favor the Poor and discriminate against the Rich.  
Two social categories favor out-group over in-group: Men and Rich. A combination of effects 
stemming from inequality aversion, social norms and group-membership may be behind this 
behavior.  
Saliency introduced through Treatments 2 and 3 seems to capture the effect of social identity. As 
expected, we find an increase of generosity when subjects know that their group, whatever the 
group, will be disclosed. The effect ranged from 0.8 (Men) to 1.7 (Strong Left-wing). Thus, for all 
the considered social categories, identity shows up as a concern for the social image of the group. 
Interestingly, we see a positive effect of Treatment 3 for Rich and Men, for which a group 
membership effect is not captured by Treatment 1. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
I N S T R U C T I O N S 
(originally in Spanish) 
 
 
 
 
 
Around 200 students have been invited to participate in this experiment, which is part of a Research 
Project in the Department of Economics of the School of Social Sciences (dECON). The purpose 
is to analyze how people take decisions in certain contexts. 
 
We will ask you to perform a series of tasks where you have to take decisions. The instructions 
are simple. All your decisions will be anonymous and we will not be able to identify you. All 
the data will be anonymized. No one will know neither the decisions you took nor the results 
obtained by any participant. 
 
Following the instructions and performing the tasks, you will have the chance to earn a certain 
amount of money. This amount will be calculated and paid to you confidentially. 
 
You can ask any questions you may have by raising your hand. Any other type of 
communication with other participants is strictly prohibited. 
 
Recall that in the questionnaire that you previously filled, we asked for information concerning 
your economic status and political preferences.  Using the information from all participants, we 
have labelled each one as: left wing if the person belongs to the 50% of people who are more to the 
left and right wing if the person belongs to the 50% of people who are more to the right. From now 
on, we will use these labels “left wing” and “right wing” to refer to these preferences.  
 
Similarly, we have labelled as Poor those in the 50% of people with lower income and Rich those in 
the 50% of people with higher income. 
	 24	
THE TASK 
 
 
 
In this task you will have a partner. There are participants in this room (which we call type A 
participants) and other participants in a different room (type B participants). You are of type A. 
 
Your partner will be a type B participant chosen at random among the people in the other room. 
You will not know who your partner is, neither now nor after (never). Moreover, your partner 
will never know who you are. 
 
Type A participants, and you in particular, have to perform the following task 
 
 
"You have been provisionally endowed with 200 pesos, for you and your 
partner (type B). You have to take a very simple decision: decide the 
portion, if any, of the 200 pesos you want to transfer to your 
partner. Your decision can be any amount between $0 and $200 expressed 
in bills of $20." 
 
 
Please, circle the amount you want to transfer to your partner: 
 
 
 
$0 $20 $40 $60 $80 $100 $120 $140 $160 $180 $200 
 
 
Now you are going to make that decision X times. That is, several times (X) you have to decide 
the amount of money (if any) that you are going to transfer to the type-B participant. Each time 
your partner will be a different person. Furthermore, you must know that type B participants are 
never type A. 
 
Of all the decisions you make, we will choose one randomly and only that decision will be 
implemented. That means that you will earn the amount of money from that decision, and your 
partner in that particular decision will earn the amount of money that you transferred. Your type 
B partner is really going to receive the amount of money that you transfer. 
 
Please, do not talk to any other participant until the session is finished. Now, you will face the 
decisions, one at a time. 
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Task	 1	
 
 
For this task, you will be randomly matched with a type B participant. Remember that neither now 
nor later (ever) will you know who your partner is, and your partner will never know who you are. 
Below there is some information about your partner. The characteristic circled in the list is the 
only thing you will know about your type B partner. If there is no characteristic circled in the list 
then you will not know anything about your partner. 
 
Information about your partner 
 
 
Man 
Woman 
Poor 
Rich 
Left-wing 
Right-wing 
 
 
 
 
With this information about your type B partner, you have to carry out the task. Decide the part, 
if any, of the 200 pesos that you want to transfer to your partner. Please, circle the amount you 
want to transfer: 
 
$0 $20 $40 $60 $80 $100 $120 $140 $160 $180 $200 
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Task	2	
For this task, you will be randomly matched with a type B participant. Remember that neither 
now nor later (ever) will you know who your partner is, and your partner will never know who 
you are. 
Notice that below there is some information about yourself, as you reported in the registration 
questionnaire. We will give this information to your partner. The characteristic circled in the list 
to the left is the only thing that your type B partner will ever know about you. If there is no 
characteristic circled in the list then your partner will not know anything about you. 
 
Information about yourself 
Man 
Woman 
Poor 
Rich 
Left-wing 
Right-wing 
 
 
 		
Knowing that B will have that information about you, you have to carry out the task. Decide the 
part, if any, of the 200 pesos that you want to transfer to your partner. Please, circle the amount 
you want to transfer: 
 
 
 
$0 $20 $40 $60 $80 $100 $120 $140 $160 $180 $200 
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Task	3	
For this task, you will be randomly matched with a type B participant. Remember that neither 
now nor later (ever) will you know who your partner is, and your partner will never know who 
you are. 
Below there is some information about your partner. The characteristic circled in the list is 
the only thing you will know about your type B partner. If there is no characteristic circled in 
the list then you will not know anything about your partner. 
Notice that below there is also some information about yourself, as you reported in the 
registration questionnaire. We will give this information to your partner. The characteristic 
circled in the list to the left is the only thing that your type B partner will ever know about 
you. If there is no characteristic circled in the list then your partner will not know anything 
about you. 
Information about yourself                           Information about your partner 
Man                                                                  Man 
Woman                                                             Woman 
Poor                                                                Poor 
Rich                                                                Rich 
Left-wing                                                          Left-wing 
Right-wing                                                       Right-wing 
 
With this information about your type B partner, and knowing that B will have that information 
about you, you have to carry out the task. Decide the part, if any, of the 200 pesos that you want 
to transfer to your partner. Please, circle the amount you want to transfer: 
 
 
 
$0 $20 $40 $60 $80 $100 $120 $140 $160 $180 $200 
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Appendix 2.  
Results of the Tobit estimation of donations 
 
Variables Coefficients Standard Errors 
Rich  -0.086 0.664  
T1w_in 3.123 0.384 *** 
Rich * T1w_in -3.747 0.486 *** 
T1w_out -1.614 0.552 *** 
Rich * T1w_out 6.018 0.619 *** 
T2w 1.043 0.291 *** 
Rich * T2w 0.460 0.452  
T3w_in 2.671 0.448 *** 
Rich * T3w_in -2.715 0.474 *** 
T3w_out -1.310 0.536 ** 
Rich * T3w_out 5.117 0.652 *** 
Right-wing 0.744 0.652  
T1p_in 2.128 0.343 *** 
Right-wing * T1p_in -0.786 0.460 * 
T1p_out -0.409 0.381  
Right-wing * T1p_out 1.069 0.579 * 
T2p 1.481 0.326 *** 
Right-wing * T2p -0.208 0.369  
T3p_in 2.235 0.395 *** 
Right-wing * T3p_in -1.470 0.440 *** 
T3p_out 0.056 0.365  
Right-wing * T3p_out 0.592 0.397  
Male -1.020 0.723  
T1s_in 1.781 0.352 *** 
Male * T1s_in -1.047 0.341 *** 
T1s_out 1.002 0.305 *** 
Male * T1s_out 0.685 0.378 * 
T2p 1.274 0.366 *** 
Male * T2s -0.468 0.351  
T3s_in 1.799 0.339 *** 
Male * T3s_in -0.944 0.391 ** 
T3s_opp 0.834 0.290 *** 
Male * T3s_out 0.580 0.377  
Displeased with Rich/Poor label 0.226 0.790  
Displeased with Right/Left label 0.312 0.678  
Constant 1.362 0.676 ** 
/sigma 3.207 0.220 *** 
Observations 1402 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
